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affixed German swastikas to the fuselage, 
and sent the plane to Germany. 
At first, the Germans were suspi-
cious of Monti. They soon decided, how-
ever, that he was the “real deal.” In 
November 1944, they enrolled him as an 
SS-Untersturmführer (second lieutenant) 
in SS-Standarte Kurt Eggers, a Waffen-SS 
propaganda unit. 
Monti began broadcasting English-
language propaganda on the radio. He 
tried to persuade GIs listening to his 
broadcasts “all over the European the-
ater” that Americans should be fighting 
with Germany against the Soviet Union, 
as Communist Russia was the “true en-
emy of world peace.”  
In April 1945, with defeat imminent 
and Germany needing all its assets on the 
front lines, SS-Untersturmführer Monti 
was ordered to join a combat unit in 
northern Italy. A month later, Monti sur-
rendered to the U.S. Fifth Army in Milan.
In the weeks that followed, Monti was 
interrogated by a series of Army intelli-
gence agents. He freely admitted that he 
had left his unit in Karachi but claimed 
that “he had done so in order to wage 
a one-man war against the Germans.” 
Monti also admitted that he had wrong-
fully appropriated the airplane in Naples, 
but only to take the fight to the Luftwaffe. 
As for the Waffen-SS uniform that he was 
wearing when he surrendered, Monti 
explained that he had been shot down 
and taken prisoner by the Germans. He 
claimed to have been in German prisoner-
of-war camps until he managed to escape. 
He then received help from Italian parti-
sans, who dressed him in a German uni-
form so that he could more easily travel 
through Axis-held territory and return 
to Allied lines.
The Army did not buy his imaginative 
cover story and, in May 1945, charged 
him with desertion and with “wrongfully, 
knowingly and willfully” misappropri-
ating “one P-38 aircraft.” A few months 
later, he was tried and convicted by a 
general court-martial in Naples. Monti 
returned to American soil and was serv-
ing time in an Army prison in New York 
when the Army offered him the chance 
to get out of jail if he would reenlist as a 
private. No doubt realizing that rejoining 
the Army was preferable to finishing his 
long jail sentence, Monti returned to the 
ranks in February 1946. Two years later, 
Monti was wearing sergeant’s stripes.
Meanwhile, Army intelligence opera-
tives were going through thousands and 
thousands of pages of captured German 
documents. Soon, these men discovered 
references to SS-Untersturmführer Monti 
and his activities while in the Waffen-SS. 
With this evidence in hand, the Department 
of Justice moved quickly, and in October 
1948, Sergeant Monti was indicted by a 
federal grand jury in the Eastern District 
of New York for the crime of treason; the 
indictment alleged 21 overt acts.
In January 1949, Monti appeared in the 
U.S. district court in Brooklyn, New York. 
He had previously entered a not-guilty 
plea to the crime. Now, standing before 
Chief Judge Robert A. Inch, Monti with-
drew this plea and informed the judge 
that he desired to plead guilty. 
The U.S. Constitution states that “No 
Person shall be convicted of Treason un-
less on the Testimony of two Witnesses 
to the same overt Act, or on Confession 
in open Court.” Mindful of this require-
ment, Monti was advised of his rights, 
was sworn, took the stand, and confessed 
in open court that he had voluntarily 
performed acts constituting the crime of 
treason, including the various overt acts 
alleged in the indictment. Chief Judge 
Inch found Monti guilty and sentenced 
him to 25 years in jail and a $10,000 fine. 
Why did Monti withdraw his not-
guilty plea? Why did he not demand trial 
on the merits? It seems that Monti’s at-
torneys believed that if they went to tri-
al, their client would likely be sentenced 
to death, or at least life imprisonment, 
given the facts and circumstances of the 
treason and the aggravating factor that 
Monti had been an Army officer. As a 
result, Monti’s two defense counsel told 
him that he should plead guilty and throw 
himself on the mercy of the court. This 
would avoid death or life imprisonment, 
and while Monti could expect a “severe” 
sentence, it would not be more than 30 
years. When Chief Judge Inch sentenced 
Monti to 25 years in jail, Monti should 
have understood that he had received 
good legal advice. 
Monti served his sentence at the U.S. 
Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. He 
was paroled from Leavenworth in 1960, 
after serving 11 years of his sentence. He 
resettled in his home state of Missouri and 
died there in 2000. He was 78 years old.
The court-martial of Lieutenant Monti, 
his restoration to active duty, and his sub-
sequent treason trial in U.S. district court 
are a unique set of events in legal history. 
Certainly, his trial in federal court stands 
out as probably the only American trea-
son case involving a confession—the sin-
gle exception to the two-witness rule in 
treason cases. q
E T H I C S
Threatening 
Litigation
B R U C E  G R E E N
The author is the director of the Louis Stein Cen-
ter for Law and Ethics, Fordham University 
School of Law.
In Ferster v. Ferster, [2016] EWCA (Civ) 
717, three disputatious brothers owned an 
English Internet gaming company. Two 
teamed up to cause the company to sue 
the third, Jonathan, for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and then offered to resolve the 
dispute by selling Jonathan their shares 
in the company. 
During mediation, the two brothers’ 
counsel increased the sales price and 
threatened that if Jonathan did not pay, 
the brothers would accuse him of perjury 
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and contempt in the pending lawsuit. 
That could lead to his imprisonment, the 
destruction of his reputation, his debar-
ment from the online gaming business, 
and, eventually, to claims against third 
parties to whom he had transferred assets. 
Jonathan, in turn, complained that his 
brothers were making improper threats 
in order to extort a ransom price for their 
shares. The English trial and appellate 
courts agreed with the lone brother, hold-
ing that the threats “exceeded what was 
‘permissible in settlement of hard fought 
commercial litigation.’” 
The English courts found that even if 
Jonathan committed the alleged crimes, 
the threats against him were improper for 
five reasons: (1) his brothers were threat-
ening criminal action; (2) their threats 
had “serious implications for Jonathan’s 
family”; (3) they also threatened to pub-
licize the allegations; (4) the threats were 
meant to benefit the brothers, not the 
company; and (5) there was no connec-
tion shown between Jonathan’s alleged 
misconduct and the increased demand. 
Would the threats be viewed just as un-
favorably by United States courts, which 
tend to be more tolerant of rough-and-tum-
ble negotiation and trial practice?  
In the United States, “prelitigation 
letters airing grievances and threaten-
ing litigation if they are not resolved 
claim by threatening unrelated crimi-
nal allegations. That’s extortionate even 
if the criminal accusation and the civil 
claim are factually supported, not fabri-
cated. Authorities will find extortionate 
threats to be “prejudicial to the admin-
istration of justice” under Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 8.4(d) or “to have 
no substantial purpose other than to em-
barrass . . . a third person” under Model 
Rule 4.4(a). 
And it is not only threats to instigate 
criminal charges that are extortionate. 
Threats to cause other harms may also be 
improper if they are unconnected to the 
underlying civil claim. For example, a de-
fense lawyer who knows that the plain-
tiff is an undocumented immigrant may 
not threaten to report the plaintiff to im-
migration authorities in order to extract 
a settlement of a lawsuit that has noth-
ing to do with the plaintiff’s immigration 
status. N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 
2005-3 (2005). 
Litigators also risk sanction—or 
worse—if there is no legitimate basis 
for their threatened action. In State v. 
Hynes, 978 A.2d 264 (N.H. 2009), for ex-
ample, the court upheld a lawyer’s extor-
tion conviction for baselessly threatening 
to sue a beauty salon for discriminatory 
pricing if it did not compensate him. 
And litigators may be punished for 
threatening to cause more than the or-
dinary embarrassment that comes with 
litigation. For example, a lawyer was 
recently sanctioned for trying to com-
pel a settlement by threatening to issue 
press releases and use other extrajudicial 
means to embarrass the opposing party. 
In re Matter of Strojnik, No. PDJ 2016-
9083 (Ariz. Nov. 16, 2016). 
The threats in the English Ferster case 
probably crossed the line even by U.S. 
standards. On the other hand, it is easy 
to stay on the right side of the line, and 
U.S. litigators don’t often cross it. They 
may still threaten to bring colorable civil 
lawsuits, inflicting all the pain that such 
lawsuits conventionally entail. q
are commonplace.” Revson v. Cinque & 
Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2000). 
Litigators may threaten to assert color-
able claims and comment on the reputa-
tional or other harm that may ensue. But 
there are limits. 
The ethics codes used to forbid lawyers 
from “threaten[ing] to present criminal 
charges solely to obtain an advantage in 
a civil matter.” Model Code of Prof’l 
Responsibility DR 7-105(A) (Am. Bar 
Ass’n 1980). The rule was based on the 
concept of extortion but went farther. 
Lawyers could not coerce a civil remedy 
by threatening criminal accusations un-
related to the civil wrong—for example, 
by threatening a thief, “Return the stolen 
money or we will tell the prosecutor that 
you possess child pornography.” 
But the rule also seemed to forbid 
some threats that were non-extortionate 
and reasonable—e.g., “Return the stolen 
money or we will report the theft to the 
prosecutor.” Given the rule’s overbreadth, 
the drafters of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct decided to scrap it 
and leave the problem to the law of ex-
tortion, which makes the relevant dis-
tinction. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Ops. 94-383 (1994) 
& 92-363 (1992).
But even in states without the old 
rule, lawyers still may not advance a civil 
